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INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Business is now regarded as corporate glass house in which both insiders and outsiders have a good view of their decisions-if and only if corporate reporting make it possible by providing more and relevant information.
Financial information helps users make prudent decisions. Although business organizations regularly publish audited financial statements, they should also ensure the transparency of financial reporting. Recent economic disasters have generated a certain level of mistrust toward companies on the part of stakeholders (Madrigal et al., 2015) . To minimize conflicts, stakeholders demand more and better information regarding financial performance, social dimension and corporate risks.
Empirical studies (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Cebenoyan et al., 1999) have revealed that asymmetric information induces banks to engage in riskier behavior. In this regard, transparent disclosures can mitigate the conflict and
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This paper investigates the effect of published disclosures in annual reports on bank credit risk. Adequate risk disclosures can ensure more transparency and, importantly, can stabilize the banking sector. Financial crises are initiated by aggressive disclosures, whereas enhanced bank disclosures have the reverse effect (Hoggarth et al., 2003; Solomon, 2005) . Financial disclosures have an increased level of importance in banking business but not in non-financial businesses. Transparent disclosures may reduce information asymmetry between internal (management or majority shareholder) and external (majority shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders) users of information. Annual reports are generally considered a reliable source of corporate information. Therefore, many researchers have concentrated on companies' annual reports to construct a disclosure index, identifying a positive correlation between disclosure levels and the amount of disclosure provided in other media (Lang and Lundholm, 1993) . This paper's motivation concerns the rational choice of the undermine economy in the South Asian region, which suffers from a lack of academic research. There has been very little research conducted in this area because of this region's social, cultural, political and economic vulnerability. Moreover, many researchers avoid South Asia as a sample because of the limited availability of information in the global database system. This study conducts a critical examination of the published annual reports of the commercial banks and shows the effect of disclosures on their risk-taking behavior. The study also investigates the probable relationship among the default risk and banks' ownership structure, financial performance and position. This work will add value to the national economy by formulating new rules and scrutinizing existing reporting conventions that can support a stable financial position over time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The literature review and the construction of hypotheses on the impact of several factors based on bank-level information are contained in the second section. The research design is discussed in the third section, and the results are presented in the fourth section. The final sections summarize the discussion and presents implications for further research.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE
Disclosures play a vital role in the transparency of financial statements between both the insiders and the outsiders of an organization. Management sometimes provides inadequate information to the diverse users of financial statements, which usually fail to serve their purpose, mislead users or convey incorrect information about the organization (Fung, 2014) . During the 1990s, most of the research on risk disclosure was based on desired outcomes, ignoring the actual form of disclosures (Woods et al., 2008) .
Some researchers have advocated transparency, showing a statistical relationship between transparency and disclosures. Botosan (1997) empirical study found a weak relationship between asset pricing and disclosure. Another extensive study, conducted by Patel and Dallas (2002) observed an inverse relationship between disclosure and market risk. The study showed that both market risk and the cost of capital are higher in the case in which a company provides a lower amount of disclosure. Apparently, companies benefit from obtaining a market premium attributable to the provision of more information in the annual report than is required. The AICPA's special committee on financial reporting (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), 1994) found that the benefit of greater disclosure is a lower cost of equity. Bushee and Noe (2000) focused on the cross-sectional relationship between risk and disclosure. Several of the relevant theories related to risk disclosure are also stated below: 
Theory
Theme & References
Stakeholder theory
The demand for risk-related information has a significant influence on the level of risk information disclosed by riskier firms, especially to influential stakeholders such as investors and creditors (Madrigala et al., 2015) Agency theory Risk-taking perceptions are affected by ownership structure. Shareholders with a diversified portfolio have more incentives and power to influence decisions in a riskier direction, whereas managers are risk averse, keeping in mind their personal interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) Moral hazard hypothesis
One study found a negative association between risk and regulatory capital (CAR) and therefore, banks are motivated to absorb more risk based on a decrease in CAR (Berger and DeYoung, 1997) .
Bad management hypothesis
One study revealed that inefficient banks may encounter difficulties in evaluating their bad loans and as a result, costs incurred as a result of bad management are related to higher default risk (Berger and DeYoung, 1997) .
Source: Constructed by Author
Bank Credit Risk
In this study, we use the accounting measure of bank risk. Accounting-based risk can be measured by credit risk, overall risk, default risk, solvency risk, and liquidity risk. This study outlines the extent of the response variable as credit risk, which is the major representative of bank risk. Credit risk is calculated by the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans (NPLR), and a higher risk for losses from loan defaults is associated with a higher ratio (Zhang et al., 2013) . This ratio is also used by Berger (1995) ; Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Gonzalez (2005) . Credit risk, also known as counter-party risk, has a significant influence in the banking sector (Al-Tamimi and Al-Mazrooei, 2007; Angelini et al., 2008; Richard et al., 2008; Lin, 2009 ). This influence is observed because a bank's performance largely depends on credit performance where ineffective credit policy breaks down banks' sustainability.
Bank Disclosures
In Asia, corporate disclosure requirements and transparency attracted regulatory attention after the 1997 financial crisis, which had a negative effect on investors' choices, with the result that international investors were reluctant to lend to developing countries. At that time, the IMF assumed a proactive role both to help the affected countries recover from the economic meltdown and to force the enactment of transparency in financial reporting systems (Fung, 2014) . Researchers not only emphasize disclosure transparency but also encourage the development of a culture of organizational transparency (O'Toole and Bennis, 2009). Baumann and Nier (2004) found that banks with more disclosures have less volatile stocks than banks with less disclosure. This finding confirms the -Stakeholder theory,‖ which states that a greater amount of disclosure affirms users' rational choice and inversely affects bank risk. Risk disclosure reduces information asymmetry and attracts the notice of both informed and uninformed investors (Poskitt, 2005) . However, Linsley and Shrives (2005) have concluded that disclosures themselves are never transparent when there is a lack of useful information. Prudent users make effective decisions based on market signals regarding a bank's financial position and performance. A high quality of disclosure can make this possible only through the fair presentation of bank statements. After examining market signals in a critical and timely manner, banks took corrective measures to reduce their exposure to risk (Oliveira et al., 2011) . Based on the empirical studies, we see a relationship between transparency and bank risk:
H1: There is a significant negative relationship between the transparency of disclosures and bank risk.
Government Ownership
Government ownership represents the percentage of government shareholdings in banks. Theoretically, government ownership has both a positive and a negative impact on bank risk. Most of the evidence supports -agency theory‖ in the controlling group's risk-taking behavior. It is assumed that government-owned banks in developing countries struggle to strengthen both financial and economic development by implementing a social and political agenda and creating new opportunities for a weaker group of people in the vein of private financing (La Porta et al., 2002) . Behind the scenes, most government-owned banks have inefficient bureaucracies and lack access to the capital markets (Lassoued et al., 2015) . Shleifer and Vishny (1986) revealed that government-owned banks fight to implement political promises by approving inefficient projects; moreover, they engage in an excessive abuse of power. Lang and So (2002) found that managers of government-owned banks both engage in activities for their personal benefit and misuse resources. This inefficiency and political arrogance damages the supremacy of the rules and regulations that burden the banking sector (Bonin et al., 2005) . Several studies (Berger et al., 2005; Angkinand and Wihlborg, 2010; Corneet et al., 2010; Iannotta et al., 2013) concluded that government-owned banks are positively associated with credit risk.
In validating these findings, we verify them in the context of developing countries, such as Bangladesh, stating our hypothesis:
H2: There is a significant positive relationship between government ownership and bank risk.
Non-Sponsor Ownership
Non-sponsor ownership consists of institutions, general and other groups of bank shareholders. Ownership structure, one component of corporate governance, is influenced by banks' risk disclosures (Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICEAW), 1997). If the ownership is not spread throughout a diverse group, the bank's risk information is disclosed only in private meetings (Madrigal et al., 2015) . Several studies conducted on ownership structure have involved diverse stakeholder groups. It has been found that a wide diversity of stakeholders commonly ensures the disclosure of more information than a limited shareholding group (Jaggi and Low, 2000) . There is no evidence of a significant relationship between non-sponsor ownership and risk-taking behavior. For this reason, the following hypothesis has been established:
H3:
There is a significant association between non-sponsor ownership and bank risk.
Capital Adequacy Ratio
CAR is the ratio of a bank's regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets and represents the reasonable amount of loss. In Bangladesh, banks' risk-based capital adequacy has been reported in financial statements under BASEL I since 1996. However, there has been no gradual improvement of these disclosures in banks' annual reports (Huang, 2006) . Mixed findings justify the association between the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and bank risk (NPLR). Several authors (Rime, 2001; Lin et al., 2005; Altunbas et al., 2007; Leaven and Levine, 2009 ) revealed that regulatory capital (CAR) is positively associated with bank risk. In contrast, others found an inverse relationship between regulatory capital and bank risk (Ho and Hsu, 2010; Agoraki et al., 2011; Lee and Chih, 2013) . These studies support the -Moral hazard hypothesis (MHH),‖ which holds that banks with strong regulatory capital can absorb higher risk. In this situation, we derive the following hypothesis:
H4: There is a significant negative relationship between capital adequacy and bank risk.
Inefficiency
Bank inefficiency is measured by the ratio of interest expense to interest income. The reason for this inefficiency is that banks operate to earn a profit, which is the differential figure between interest income and expense. To ensure the quality of earnings, banks must rely on the core ingredient of income, rather than other sources. In this case, inefficiency results in lower interest income through the inefficient distribution of loans and advances from total deposits. According to the -Bad Management‖ hypothesis, inefficiency is positively associated with a bank's credit risk. The possible cause for this is the increase of nonperforming loans, which silently deteriorate future earnings. Again, Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) ; Altunbas et al. (2007) and Agusman et al. (2008) found that inefficiency is positively related to risk-taking; this finding is also supported by the -Moral Hazard Hypothesis (MHH)‖. These arguments suggest the following hypothesis:
H5: There is a significant positive relationship between inefficiency and bank risk.
Advances to Total Assets
Advances to total assets measures banks' lending performance. Prior research (Brucker, 1970) found that the higher the proportion of resources placed in loans is, the better a bank's financial performance is. Advances to total assets measures a bank's ability and willingness to transform its idle deposits into productive resources. In this way, banks play a role in capital formation (Moulton, 1981) . Usually, better lending performance depends on a bank's lower default risk. This evidence suggests the following hypothesis:
H6: There is a relationship between advances to total assets and bank risk.
Tier 1 Capital
Tier 1 capital is the core measure of a bank's financial strength. Banks with such more capital are able to absorb loss events and can continue despite regulatory precautions. Tier 1 capital also determines the level of risk that a bank is willing to take. A change in Tier 1 capital independently changes risk in the same direction. Therefore, the following hypothesis has been established:
H7:
There is a significant positive relationship between Tier 1 capital and bank risk.
RESEARCH DESIGN
This study is based on a systematic process that ensures its trustworthiness 1 . To support the research findings, secondary data are used in an empirical quantitative fashion. The main sources of data are banks' annual reports because most developing and developed countries widely use annual reports as one major source (among others) of reliable information (Akhtaruddin, 2005; Alattar and Al-Khater, 2007; Catasús, 2008; Chau and Gray, 2010) .
Empirical studies (Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003; Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004) show that the annual report is a formal source of information in developing countries. However, the annual report is not the only source:
shareholders can also retrieve information through either direct sources or media publications. In this regard, the study relies on annual reports as a major source of data. This study also examines a single country because Bangladesh's sociopolitical and economic environment is different from those of other countries in the Asian region.
Moreover, there is a lack of adequate research in the field of risk disclosures in Bangladesh's financial sector.
Data
The dataset is constructed based on panel data consisting of 5 years (2010-2014) of time series data and 32 commercial banks' longitudinal data. There are 160 observations. In 2010, 47 banks operated in Bangladesh in 4 categories of scheduled banks: state-owned commercial banks (SCBs), development finance institutions (DFIs), private commercial banks (PCBs) and foreign commercial banks (FCBs). The structure of the banking sector broken down by bank type is shown below: 
Measurement of Variables
The dependent variable is the risk of the bank, which is measured by nonperforming loans to total loans (NPLR). This variable indicates the bank's default rate, which simultaneously affects the bank's overall position and performance. This study also identified several independent variables, based on prior research, to perform a statistical analysis to draw a conclusion about whether the effect of the independent variable changes the dependent variable to some extent. The independent variables are shown in the following table: 
Methodology
To examine the transparency of disclosures' effect on banks' risk-taking behavior in Bangladesh's banking sector, we have generated the following regression model: The regression model is separately employed for the two variables (GOVOWN and NSOWN) . The nature of the dataset is panel data. Several studies (Hsiao, 1986; Baltagi, 2001 ) observed that panel data control individual heteroskedasticity, reducing both multicollinearity and the biased estimation problem. In our study, we examine the heteroskedasticity (White) test, which accepts the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level and tests serial correlation (the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test), which is also significant at the 1% level. These diagnoses suggest the rejection of the ordinary least square (OLS) method to test the model. The correlated random effect (Hausman test) ensures that there is a random effect on the given dataset. Additional analyses are conducted based on further diagnosis to support the outcome of the research. The dataset is restricted because of the problem of heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional correlation and first-order autoregressive correlation AR (1) in the error terms. The Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) and Prais Winsten Regression (PCSE) methods can overcome the limitation of the existing dataset (Wooldridge, 2006) . These methods enable cross-sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity across panels. In our study, we interpret the results using both methods to prove the robustness of the model. In the independent variables, there is a strong collinearity between GOVOWN and NSOWN. To avoid bias, we formulate two variables separately in the regression model.
RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 4 were constructed using SPSS 17 for thirty-two (32) commercial banks from 2010 to 2014. The response variable (NPLR) has a very small deviation: 5.52% within the year and among the banks. This also reveals that for 2012, 2013 and 2014, a government-owned bank (Sonali Bank Ltd.) has the maximum non-performing loan rate (NPLR), at 33.09%, 30.01% and 25.44%, respectively. In the explanatory variables, BDI has a mean value of 91.58%, which is close to the minimum and maximum values of 80.95% and 95.25%. The reason for this finding that there is regulatory pressure for mandatory disclosure of risk-related information in annual reports. The most noticeable figure is the minimum value of CAR, which is -6.15%, although the average value is 11.19%, which is greater than the minimum capital requirement of 10%. In 2012, two (2) government-owned banks (Agrani Bank Ltd. and Sonali Bank Ltd.) had a negative capital adequacy ratio. Thus, we can infer that government-owned banks are reluctant to address risk-related information properly. These banks violate the minimum capital requirement rules even in the presence of both strong regulatory pressure and monitoring forces. Moreover, it is also remarkable that INEFFIC contains maximum a value of 144.51%, which indicates a high level of inefficiency, as well as management failure. It was also evidenced that for 2012, 2013, and 2014, one government-owned bank (Sonali Bank Ltd.) incurs more interest expense than interest income. 
Baseline Models
The baseline regression examines the association between the explained variable (NPLR) and the explanatory variables (BDI, GOVOWN, NSOWN, CAR, INEFFIC, ATA and TIER1). The study uses the Paris Winsten Regression (PCSE) and the Feasible Generalized Least Square Regression (FGLS) methods. The initial test result found that the dataset is affected by heteroskedasticity and the serial correlation problem.
Although some authors (Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Wintoki et al., 2012) found that bank disclosure (BDI), ownership (GOVOWN and NSOWN) and regulatory capital (CAR) are endogenous variables with respect to risk (NPLR), our study confirms that these variables are exogenous variables. Moreover, we test whether there is any lag effect on the model, but the result shows that the current year positions are not affected by the previous year data. Table 6 shows that bank risk disclosure (BDI) is negatively associated with bank risk (NPLR) in both models.
Model I (PCSE) shows that BDI is significant (p<0.05 and p<0.10) in both situations of ownership structure (GOVOWN, NSOWN), and Model II (FGLS) reconfirms the association in the same direction at the 1% level of significance. The result is valid and similar to previous studies (Jaggi and Low, 2000; Corneet et al., 2010; Oliveira et al., 2011; Iannotta et al., 2013) . The fact underlying this outcome is that if banks publish adequate risk-related information in their annual reports, they will be more transparent and will be able to reduce risk. In this way, both bank and customer submit to pressure by disclosing information, which is available to concerned groups, regarding credit default.
In the ownership structure (GOVOWN and NSOWN), Models I and II confirm that GOVOWN and NSOWN are statistically significant (p<0.01), but GOVOWN is positively associated with NPLR, whereas NSOWN has an inverse effect. Previous studies (Berger et al., 2005; Angkinand and Wihlborg, 2010; Corneet et al., 2010; Iannotta et al., 2013) advocate and validate the current result. Most of Bangladesh's political parties make promises to the people to obtain a mandate in national elections. This is why they are trying to implement their political agenda by investing more money in social projects (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) . Accordingly, a higher percentage of non-sponsor owners results in less risky bank behavior (Jaggi and Low, 2000) . The reason is that the heterogeneous composition of shareholders ensures more public disclosure than private disclosure of information (Madrigal et al., 2015) . It also supports the -stakeholder theory‖ that diverse groups seek more information so that they can make prudent decisions that will negatively affect risk.
The Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) in Models I and II are negatively associated with bank default risk (NPLR) and are statistically significant (p<.01), similar to Ho and Hsu (2010) ; Agoraki et al. (2011) ; Lee and Hsieh (2013) ;
and Lee and Chih (2013) . In Bangladesh, we find that most of the commercial banks, especially private banks are very concerned about both regulatory capital requirements and credit policy. They are concerned about granting credits in unproductive sectors, ignoring pressure by outsiders. For this reason, regulatory capital (CAR) is negatively associated with bank default risk (NPLR) in Bangladesh. Banks' lending performance (ATA) in Models I and II shows an inverse relationship with bank risk (NPLR) and is statistically significant at the 1% level. Although there is little evidence to establish the relationship between ATA and NPLR, Brucker (1970) revealed that better financial performance by a bank depends on the placement of a high proportion of bank resources in loans, implying a negative association with default risk (NPLR). Bank performance depends entirely on lower default risk (NPLR) and ensures higher management efficiency.
Tier 1 capital is positively associated with bank default risk and is statistically significant in both Model I (P<0.05) and Model II (P<0.10). This result implies that higher Tier 1 capital (Core Capital) stimulates banks to take more risk to capture the market. In Bangladesh, it is found that the number of banks increased to 19.15% from 2010 to 2014. Thus, competition among banks is increasing every day. Some banks adopt an aggressive strategy to sustain the market with a higher market share, tempting them to grant more credit in a diverse manner that involves absorbing higher risk. Sometimes, banks cannot flourish in catering to the masses because of the existence of strong competitors such as non-bank financial institutions and NGOs. Microfinance 3 policy is one of the most successful projects in Bangladesh that reaches out to the masses, distributing no-collateral loans without strict regulations. This entire scenario prompts banks to take more risk to uphold a higher level of Tier 1 capital.
Robustness Checks
The previous analyses allow us to assess the robustness of the model. To verify the consistency of the result, we use default risk proxy as loan loss provision to total loan (NPLR). Similarly, we change the CAR measurement to Tier 1 plus Tier 2 divided by total assets, also revealing banks' capital adequacy ratio. We also conducted the initial diagnosis of the Hausman random effect test, the White heteroskedasticity test, the LM serial correlation test and the endogenous test. The result reveals that the dataset has a random effect and the variables are exogenous, but there is problem of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. In this situation, Wooldridge (2006) suggested using PCSE and FGLS regression model to test the hypothesis. According, we conduct an operation similar to our previous analysis. Reported in parentheses are standard errors. *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. Table 7 shows that bank default risk (NPLR) is significantly affected by all of the dependent variables. In comparing the models, it shows that Model II (FGLS) provides more consistent results in robust tests with the baseline model. In Model I (PCSE), the significance level changes from 5% to 10% for BDI, 1% to 5% for INEFFIC and 5% to 10% for the Tier 1 variable when the GOVOWN variable is used. However, in the application of NSOWN, only the significance level of the INEFFIC variable changes from the 10% to the 5% level. In both cases, we can say that the model is best fit because more than 50% of the data are explained by the independent variables.
Moreover, there is no change of coefficient direction compared to baseline models.
CONCLUSIONS
In Bangladesh, there is stiff competition in the financial market to attract the attention of investors. To satisfy stakeholders' needs, financial institutions, such as banks, should provide more information in their annual reports such that all concerned groups (both internal and external) can make prudent decisions. The information provider must ensure that the information has qualitative characteristics (relevance, reliability, comparability and consistency). The study reveals that adequate disclosure can beat the market and minimize risks, ultimately improving the bank's bottom line. Transparent disclosures not only ensure profitability but also create permanent reliance by investors, decreasing future uncertainties. It is found that disclosing more information about key items minimizes the bank's risk and establishes a transparent image in the marketplace. The results also indicate that government ownership increases bank risk because of the establishment of a political agenda involving the use of excessive power, whereas an increase in non-sponsor ownership inversely affects risk because diverse groups concurrently affect investment decisions through their risk-neutral behavior. The remaining variables behave the same as they do in earlier research. The results of the tested hypothesis are provided below: Not to Reject H2 There is a significant positive relationship between government ownership and bank risk.
Not to Reject H3 There is a significant association between non-sponsor ownership and bank risk.
Not to Reject H4 There is a significant negative relationship between capital adequacy and bank risk.
Not to Reject H5 There is a significant positive relationship between inefficiency and bank risk.
Not to Reject H6 There is a relationship between advances to total assets and bank risk.
Not to Reject H7 There is a significant positive relationship between tier 1 capital and bank risk.
Not to Reject
Our study supports the enhancement of transparent disclosure with a strong governance mechanism that can minimize the rapid growth of risk. Issues relating to bank risk should be properly addressed both by the regulatory bodies and by bank management, presenting a united front to ensure a better financial position in the market. Stable financial positions attract legitimate investors and can prevent market disorder.
Contribution of the Study
This study's primary contribution is empirical evidence of the relationship between bank disclosure, ownership style, other bank-level variables and bank default risk in Bangladesh, which is an overlooked research area in the Asian region. This is the first research conducted in Bangladesh in this area. Further research could compare most of the literature developed from Western countries with the current study.
Second, there is very little evidence of single-country experiments in bank-risk disclosures. Previous studies have been conducted by Amran et al. (2009); Othman and Ameer (2009); Murugesu and Santhapparaj (2010) and Ismail and Rahman (2011) in Malaysia. Moreover, our study adds value as a single-country experiment because each country has its own style of operations based on its socioeconomic culture.
Third, the study identified a serious concern regarding ownership style in that government involvement positively affects the risk of the bank, providing policy makers with evidence that supports either denationalizing or significantly reducing government ownership of existing banks in the future. 
